CODE-NAME:
BRIGHT LIGHT --
A Review
Summary: Former Army Captain George J. Veith has written a book
titled Codename: BRIGHT LIGHT that details the efforts to find and rescue
Americans who were held as prisoners of war (POW) during the Vietnam War. There are
other reviews of Bright Light out there and this is one more. My review
reaches these conclusons:
- As a history of the JPRC, Bright Light is fine.
The author has done a detailed study of available documents, has used interviews with the
people who were there to fill in the gaps, and he does a good job of telling this story
that needs to be told.
- The book is misleading when it attempts to be a commentary on
the question of what the Vietnamese or the Lao know about our missing men, as a commentary
on whether or not men were abandoned alive after Homecoming, and as a commentary on the
meaning of intelligence reports from during and after the war. The author's
unquestioning reliance on raw reporting and his use of questionable "experts"
make this element of the book extremely weak, even useless.
Background
I will not go into a lot of detail trying to re-tell the plot of Bright Light.
Briefly, as the Vietnam War expanded, several levels of command recognized that
while Search and Rescue (SAR) units and efforts went into loss sites immediately after men
were lost, there was no real effort to develop intelligence on lost men and, if they were
discovered to be alive, to mount a rescue attempt. This "post-SAR"
did not exist and the US command structure felt that something had to be put into place.
The result was the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). A
joint command -- staffed by people from all services -- JPRC was charged with developing
intelligence on where US POWs were then trying where possible to rescue them.
Veith worked from files at various places, including previously unexploited records at
the Army's Center for Military History. He went a step further in his research in
that he located several of the people mentioned in the written record and interviewed
them. His inclusion of these interviews adds depth, realism, and a touch of humanity
to the book.
If anyone is interested, I recommend you read the book for yourself. It is
available at most large booksellers (Books A Million, Barnes & Noble, Borders
all should have it). If all else fails, here is a link to
Amazon.com where you can purchase the book.
It's a Good Tale That Needs to Be Told
So, what did I think of the book? (If anyone is interested.) I think the
book is a story that needs to be told and that Veith told it well. There are three
threads that run through this book as the author traces the history of the JPRC:
- No matter how badly it was needed, JPRC seemed always to be a poor stepchild.
- JPRC encountered enormous political, inter-service, and command relationship problems
with even the simplest of tasks.
- JPRC was plagued with the reality of intelligence: Accurate, timely, reliable
intell is tough to get.
A Poor Stepchild
While JPRC had its own personnel and organization, it never really had the full staff,
troops, aircraft, and command clout that it needed to react quickly. In most
cases, when JPRC developed information that seemed sufficient to launch a rescue
operation, they had to go begging for assets -- troops, helicopters, air support, and the
like. What amazed me was that they were able to put together as many operations as
they did.
Politics and Rivalries
At practically every stage, JPRC had to fight for permission and authority to do their
job. This fact is most clearly illustrated in the numerous incidents, recounted by
the author, when JPRC wanted to mount rescue operations in Laos. Because there were
no US forces in Laos (officially), anything that went on there had to be cleared through
the ambassador and his clearance was, in every case, slow in coming, if it came at all.
Time and again, as I was reading Bright Light, I found myself feeling the
same frustrations that the JPRC folks must have felt as they sat in Vietnam with intell in
hand, troops ready to go, and no approval for the US ambassador in Laos. The story
of the attempt to rescue a US escapee in Laos (Butcher) is the ultimate in frustration.
Good Intell is Tough to Find
Time and again, JPRC received reports telling of US POWs being held here, there, and
elsewhere. Often, JPRC would show the source -- usually a Vietnamese farmer,
woodcutter, or prisoner -- maps and recent aerial photographs, trying to pin down exactly
where the source saw the American(s) he claimed to have seen. In so many cases,
while it appeared that the source was being truthful, he simply could not read a map or
aerial photo and JPRC was left frustrated.
The author relates many other cases in which sufficient intell was developed to conduct
a rescue operation and the operation freed ARVN POWs, found warm cooking fires, found
where Americans had been minutes or hours before, but never found any Americans. In
fact, many POWs were rescued by JPRC operations; it's just that none of them were
Americans. Thus, their operations could by no means be classified as failures.
So What Does This Mean?
I believe that the author missed a real opportunity to make a contribution to future
POW rescue operations. While telling a story completely and in detail is laudable, Bright
Light fell down in several areas, the first being the lack of a lessons learned
chapter. Go back to the three points that I raised above as having plagued JPRC.
Does any of this sound familiar? Under-resourced? Inter-service,
inter-command, inter-agency rivalry? Insufficient intelligence? Reliance on
other agencies for people, transportation, fire support, and intelligence? Think
that these problems were all solved with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the wake of Grenada?
Think again.
If you think JPRC had a constant uphill climb, just exactly how do you think we will
put together POW rescue operations in, say, Serbia or Kosovo? Operations there will
be plagued, not just buy internal US rivalries, but also by multi-national coordination
problems of unspeakable proportions. How do we operate secret POW rescue operations
in a multi-national environment where we may be dependent on air cover from one nation,
ground support from another, and fire support from a third -- all the while operating
across several national boundaries?
The problem of obtaining reliable, timely intelligence in such an environment will be
extremely difficult. The counter-intelligence and leak problems will doom many
operations before they get started.
I believe that the author of Bright Light could have spent his concluding
chapters much more wisely had he translated the JPRC lessons learned into some suggestions
for future operations. After all, is that not the purpose of history?
Some Problems with Bright Light
Mr. Veith has done a good job of recounting the history of the JPRC and of POW rescue
attempts in SEAsia. Had he stuck with that topic, his book would have been strong.
However, he ventures into intelligence analysis without fully exploring what he is
analyzing and, in those instances, he injects problems into his work.
In several places, he cites a report then later uses that report to "confirm"
another report. The problem is that, in a few instances, one or more of the reports
that he uses as corroboration is/are not corroborative because his version of the report
is not complete or accurate. Let me describe a few such incidents.
The "Volleyball Game" Photo
The photo and initial readouts
Early in his book, Veith refers to the "volleyball photo." In late 1969
(I am not certain of the date, this is what I recall), an RF-101 on a photo recce mission
over southern Laos returned with photographs of a group of people engaged in what appeared
to be a volleyball game, in a large cleared area in front of the mouths of some caves.
There were 20 - 30 people, about half of them facing the other half over what
appeared to be a net, with some bystanders. The photo was shot at a place named Ban
Nakay Theu (probably not the correct spelling), a site along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Readouts done at the time speculated that there may be Americans among the people
photographed. Readouts also "identified" an armed guard and a man who
appeared to be waving at the aircraft.
What the photo really showed
The initial readouts of this photography stood for several years and were the source of
much misinformation and speculation. Bright Light continues to spread this
misinformation and speculation. In Bright Light, the "volleyball
photo" becomes a touchstone by which all sort of other reports are
"confirmed." At several points in the book, the author recites reports of
10, 20, 30 Americans being held in Laos, refers to the photo, and concludes that, well,
there must have been 10, 20, or 30 Americans there because here are two corroborative
reports.
The author either missed or chose to ignore the work done on the photo in the late
1980's. While I was in the DIA POW-MIA shop, I asked imagery analysts at the
National Photo Interpretation Center to see if they could analyze the "volleyball
photo" using state of the art techniques not available when the photo was shot.
They retrieved the original film taken by the RF-101 and found that there was not
one but two "volleyball" photos.
The RF-101 has several cameras mounted in different points on the aircraft; nose and
belly cameras are most common with belly cameras looking both down and to the side.
As the aircraft zips along, the camera(s) fire, automatically advance the film and fire
again until the pilot turns them off or they run out of film.
Imagery analysts use, when they can get them, stereoscopic views. A stereo camera
has two lenses set a few inches apart, focusing two images on two separate parts of the
same piece of film. Because of the separation of the lenses, the image becomes
stereoscopic -- three dimensional -- and when viewed through stereo viewfinders, images
stand out from the background. The effect is striking, being able to see in three
dimensions rather than in flat two dimensions.
The RF-101 did not have stereo cameras but, as the aircraft flew forward, and as the
camera fired in succession, the same scene was photographed from two different angles.
The imagery analysts used the two images, taken a few yards apart, to produce a
stereoscopic view that cleared up lots of questions about the photo. Here is what
they found and reported to us at DIA:
- The item that had been identified as a guard with a weapon was actually a bush.
- The man who was "waving" at the aircraft -- possibly a US POW signaling -- was
actually urinating onto a low shrub.
- Every single person in the photo had black hair.
- The average height of people in the photo was under 5' 7".
- The item that had been identified as an individual running toward the aircraft was a
bush with a piece of white cloth, possible a shirt, thrown over it.
- There was no evidence of weapons visible.
Also, in the late 1980's, I tasked the native Lao interviewer in the office to search
out people in Laotian communities worldwide who may have had any knowledge of Ban Nakay
Theu around that time. He found a few Laotians who had been impressed into labor
service or who had friends who had been used for labor in the area, mostly by the PAVN.
They all reported that volleyball was about the only recreation they had and none
of them had any knowledge of American POWs in the Ban Nakay Theu area.
These reports were in writing, all in the DIA (now DPMO) files and were available
through the Freedom of Information Act. Had the author simply used this common
research tool, he could have learned that the "volleyball" photo had nothing to
do with US POWs. Of course, if he had done that, then all the reports that he
corroborated with the volleyball photo would have come to naught.
Unquestioning Acceptance of "Reports"
The MIA issue is plagued by amateur analysts and junior G-men who, upon reading a
report, declare that they have found the Rosetta Stone. Some dig even deeper,
corroborating one report with another until they have built a huge case of what appears to
the uncritical reader to be mutually-supporting reports.
The problem with such an approach is that reports are just that: reports.
Some are accurate and true. Some are a bit of truth and a bit of garbage.
Some are bogus. All bear investigating but the investigator must maintain healthy
skepticism. It is that skepticism that is missing in Bright Light.
The author simply repeats reports, with no effort made to examine their validity.
Beating the PAVN with chains
On page 279 of the paperback edition, the author recounts the story of the US POW in
Laos who beat to death three PAVN with chains when they attempted to chain him to a table.
According to the report, he was deemed incorrigible and moved to Hanoi. Now,
this is a rollicking tale that the author accepts at face value. I cannot accept
this report as being even vaguely true. In the first place, I am to believe that a
US POW overpowered and killed three PAVN interrogators and lived to be moved to Hanoi?
How long does it take to beat to death three men with a chain? Where
were the PAVN or PL guards while all this ruckus was going on? Why did no returnee
report such an incident? This story -- which is often associated with USAF Captain
Charles Shelton -- simply does not pass the basic test of being reasonable.
On the same page, the author quotes a "CIA" report of 27 American POWs in
Laos being moved to Hanoi.
It appears to me that, in both these cases, the author is simply reporting something
that he read in a file with no attempt to ascertain what it is that he is reporting.
In every case of reports coming from the field, there is, at the end of the report,
a comment by the agent collecting the report and, often, by a headquarters analyst,
commenting on the reliability of the source and the general accuracy of the report.
I cannot tell you how many times I have had a "POW researcher" wave a report in
my face claiming that he has found proof, only to have me point out to him the agency
comment that the source had reported unreliably in the past and that the information in
the report was contradicted by other, more reliable reports.
Thus, while the author cites, time and again, report after report, I am left with the
sense that he is doing just that: quoting from reports, not attempting to ascertain
the validity of what he is citing.
Sompongs
On pages 343 - 345, the author again falls into the trap of repeating reports by
relating the Sompongs story. It seems that an individual named Sompongs showed up in
Thailand claiming that, for a price, he could liberate up to 30 US POWs held in the Sam
Nuea area of Laos. Veith goes on to relate this story that finally falls apart when
Sompongs cannot deliver and fails to show up again. However, Veith closes with
references to the previous CIA reports of prisons in the area and to the volleyball photo
-- because there were CIA reports of prisons in the area, because of the volleyball photo,
and because of the similarities among the CIA report, the volleyball photo, and the
Sompongs report, there must be 10, 20, or 30 US POWs out there. This is a classic
example of using nonsense to prove other nonsense.
As I started reading the Sompongs story, I had a real sense of deja vu.
I had heard this before. It is a common story: " I have a
friend/relative/colleague who has access to US POWs and for a price, we can get them out.
" Sompongs, in 1971, was merely ahead of his time; in the 1980's and 90's, scam
artists were showing up with far more elaborate stories than his. The Sompongs story
is such an obvious fake that I really have to wonder what the author hoped to prove by
using it. Then, he compounded the problem by using other irrelevant reports as
corroboration. (Does the author really believe that, as Sompongs reported, US
POWs were "teaching English to their PL captors"?)
Reliance on Jerry Mooney
Mr. Veith does not help his case by his reliance on one of the real sources of
mis-information in the MIA issue, retired USAF Master Sergeant Jerry Mooney.
Briefly, Mooney was an AF signals intelligence analyst who served one tour of duty, not in
Vietnam, but at a WESTPAC base where he analyzed PAVN logistic traffic. He is not a
Vietnamese linguist. Mooney is the source of bad analysis concerning the crew
of Baron 52, an EC-47Q electronic reconnaissance aircraft lost
over Laos. Mooney is represented as being the expert on PAVN air defenses. He
is not; he did not work PAVN air defenses. Mooney's big chance came when he
presented his "evidence" to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs.
After working with Mooney for some days, the SSC concluded in their report:
"In any event, Mooney's material has allowed Committee
investigators to bring together a great deal of material as an additional check on the
information that NSA has on hand. His efforts on behalf of the POW-MIA issue are greatly
appreciated."
Now, this not-exactly-ringing-endorsement of Mooney came at the end of the section of
the SSC report that repeated all of Mooney's claims and, in each case, found that he could
not substantiate any of his claims. Veith uses Mooney to substantiate signal intelligence
reports that Mooney simply is in no position to substantiate.
I had an opportunity in early 1993 to view the "working documents" that
Mooney presented to the SSC. He had taken approximately 150 sheets of typing paper
and a handful of felt-tipped markers. On the paper he had drawn pictures,
cartoon-like pictures, stick-figure aircraft, stick-figure AAA guns firing streams of
bullets, stick-figure Americans in parachutes, all adorned with the words of the song
"Where have all the young men gone, long time passing . . . " Page after
page of hand-drawn cartoons. That, my friends, is Jerry Mooney's documentation.
Mr. Veith could have obtained this through FOIA.
"Salted" sites
Mr. Veith also does his case no good in his one reference to "salted" remains
sites. The background on this is that there is an unfounded claim by many POW-MIA
activists that the Vietnamese have teeth, bones, and artifacts collected from missing
Americans and that they chase around the countryside putting these items into contrived
gravesites which they allow US investigators to discover.
On page 35, Veith partially describes the recovery of the remains of two missing
Americans, USMC Privates Fred Schreckengost and Robert Greer,
about whom a vast mythology was constructed. Information available at the time or
their disappearance was that they had been shot to death within a day or two of capture
and buried where they fell. In November 1990, after narrowing down the area of the
grave, a US team recovered their remains from the hole in which they had lain since their
deaths. Veith cites a claim by retired MSG Bill Bell that the remains may have been
"salted." Nonsense. Veith could have, through FOIA, obtained the
complete report of the recovery and analysis of the remains from which he would have
learned that no one "salted" anything. In fact, there is no evidence
whatsoever of "salting" of remains or gravesites. One wonders why the
author did not track down this story through a simple FOIA request.
So, What's The Verdict
At the beginning of this article, I stated that "My review is as schizophrenic as
the book." That's it. My view of this book goes two ways:
- As a history of the JPRC, it is fine. The author has done a detailed study
of available documents, has used interviews with the people who were there to fill in the
gaps, and he does a good job of telling this story that needs to be told.
- The book is misleading when it attempts to be a commentary on the question of
what the Vietnamese or the Lao know about our missing men, as a commentary on whether or
not men were abandoned alive after Homecoming, and as a commentary on the meaning of
intelligence reports from during and after the war. The author's unquestioning
reliance on raw reporting and his use of questionable "experts" make this
element of the book extremely weak, even useless.
Want to Buy It?
Click here to go to Amazon.com if you wish to purchase Code-Name
Bright Light : The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War
This article added to MIA Facts Site on March 21,
1999.
|